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Abstract 
 
The decline in the sub-prime market in the United State of America in 2007 -2008 and 
the corresponding decline in the market values of other financial investments has had 
a significant financial impact on many of the individuals and organisations who 
participated in aggressively promoted investment schemes.  The New South Wales 
(NSW) Local Government Councils was one such group of organisations impacted by 
the decline in value of these types of investments.  At the end of the 2006-2007 
financial year local councils in New South Wales had invested $590 million dollars in 
structured financial products such as collateralised debt obligations (CDO).  By the 
end of January 2008, six months later, the market value of these investments dropped 
$200 million (34%) to $390 million.  In response to the decreasing value of the local 
council investments the NSW State Government commissioned a review of the 
financial exposures of NSW local councils in structured financial products.  The 
review found that while acting within the parameters of the Local Government Act 
(1993), local councils had pursued high return high risk investment strategies.  This 
paper reviews and evaluates financial investment exposures of the local councils in 
NSW and the resulting mix (unqualified/qualified) independent audit opinions issued 
on their general purpose financial reports.  This paper will contribute to the literature 
on the wide spread impact of the 2008 global financial crisis as well as the quality of 
Local Government council financial report audits. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The New South Wales (NSW) State Government Department of Local 
Government (DLG) is a state regulatory agency responsible for providing policy and 
the legislative foundation for local councils in New South Wales.  The DLG is 
responsible for the overall legal management and financial framework for Local 
Government (DLG, 2009).  This responsibility is disclosed in the Local Government 
Act of 1993 (hereafter referred to as the 1993 Act) and “provides the legal framework 
for an effective, efficient, environmentally responsible and open system of Local 
Government in New South Wales” (section 7. LG Act 1993).  In addition to being 
responsible for the implementation of the 1993 Act the Department of Local 
Government also provides policy advice to the NSW State Government, manages the 
relationship between councils and the State Government and is responsible for the 
financial framework under which Local Governments operate (DLG 2008a).   
The 1993 Act gives councils the authority “to carry out activities, appropriate 
to the current and future needs of local communities” (section 7. LG Act 1993).  To 
this end section 625 of the 1993 Act provides councils with the authority to invest 
monies not required for immediate use by the council in a range of financial 
instruments.  This authority to invest monies provided by the ratepayers within the 
community, has a number of restrictions with respect to the types of allowed 
investment types, which are outlined in Investment Order of the Minister for Local 
Government (refer appendix 1). 
This paper looks at the financial exposures of councils in NSW with respect to 
their investments in structured financial products such as collateralised debt 
obligations (CDOs) and the impact of the significant decrease in the market value of 
many of these investments.  It further examines the investment exposures of councils 
as disclosed the financial reports of 2007/08, how the independent financial report 
auditors addressed the investment issues and the impact investment exposures may 
have on the ability of local councils in NSW to continue to provide services for their 
constituents.  The following section is a brief outline of the history of the NSW Local 
Governments and will provide a background for the paper. 
 
BACKGROUND TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE IN AUSTRALIA 
 
Australia operates under a three tier government system consisting of Federal 
(Commonwealth) Government; State Government and, Local Government (Boon et 
al, 2005). The Federal Government, under the Commonwealth Constitution Act 1900, 
oversees a federation consisting of six states and two territories (Burritt and Welch 
1997) and within the States and Territories are Local Government councils who, in 
Australia, are responsible for building and maintaining roads, developing 
infrastructure for essential services, such as water supply and providing waste 
removal, community sporting facilities and care services such as child and aged care 
(Boon et al, 2005).  Due to the omission of any mention of Local Government 
authorities within the Commonwealth Constitution (Stilwell and Troy 2000) Local 
Government councils are reliant on the states and territories for authority to perform 
their functions and to raise funds.  Local Government powers continue to be defined 
and controlled by State Government ministers who have the authority to remove or 
reduce Local Government powers and responsibilities, or even change their 
boundaries (Stilwell and Troy 2000, p. 924).  Nevertheless, Local Governments 
understand and appreciate the local and regional issues better than either the Federal 
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or State Governments and it is the local councils that are the “most sensitive to” 
community interests, even though they have been “relegated to a subordinate role” 
(Stilwell and Troy 2000, p. 909).  This paper focuses on the Local Government 
councils in the Australian state of New South Wales (NSW). 
 
NSW LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPOSURE 
 
Since the enactment of the 1993 Act Local Government councils have been 
predominantly investing in short term income-producing products, such as CDOs, and 
due to the nature of their operations and organisational objectives the funds invested 
are more likely to be needed to fund long term infrastructure requirements (Gold 
2008), such as road building and maintenance.   
There are a variety of reasons for Local Government councils investing 
financial resources in income-producing products. If a council is unable to get a return 
from their investments then their financial reserves would gradually be eroded due to 
the effects of inflation which inturn would reduce their ability to fund future 
infrastructure investments and meet long term liabilities such as employee 
entitlements.  However, it seems that Local Government councils in pursuing high 
return investments have not only been trying to preserve the buying power of their 
capital, but have also using financial reserves to generate profits with which to finance 
current spending requirements. This policy has the capacity to create a number of 
issues as pursuing higher returns also means accepting higher levels of risk. Therefore 
the implication of high return capital investments is that the returns and potentially the 
capital also could be unsecured leaving the Local Government councils at risk of 
significant losses.  
To determine the justifications behind why councils are willing to pursue 
higher risk investments, even if they are high yielding, an understanding of the 
revenue constraints within the sector needed to be developed (Gold 2008, p 37). 
Councils derive the bulk of their own-source revenue from property rates. In NSW, a 
formal "pegging" regime exists which constrains councils - without prior ministerial 
approval - from increasing rates above broad measures of inflation (Gold 2008). Local 
Government councils are increasingly being asked to provide more services and take 
over the roles previously carried out by Federal and State Governments such as 
“provide pensioner rebates and concessions; incurring costs to maintain roads and 
airports transferred from other tiers of government ownership; and non-indexation of 
fees and charges” without “corresponding commensurate increases in funding” (Gold, 
2008. p 38). Revenue raising powers are concentrated at the federal level, and a 
concentration of expenditure functions are carried out at the state and Local 
Government, which creates reliance by Local Government councils on funds from 
Federal and State Governments to fund operations (Dollery, Fletcher and Prasada 
Rao, 1998).  The likelihood of underfunding and heavy reliance on funding from 
Federal and State Governments has encouraged local councils to pursue the higher 
returns from market based investments.  This is consistent with one of the findings of 
the Cole report “… the attraction of NSW Councils of higher prospective returns 
offered by new investments different from the traditional suite of fixed interest 
products was an enticing proposition” (2008, p. 9).   
In the financial year 2007-08 the NSW Local Government sector was a $7.3 
billion industry with the councils collecting $3.5 billion in rates and charges (DLG 
2008b, p. 6).  Unlike the majority of other public sector organisations the local 
councils in NSW have been allowed, under section 625 of the 1993 Act, to invest in a 
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variety of investment schemes for the purpose of earning additional revenue.  As at 30 
June 2007 the face value of the total investments of NSW local councils totalled $5.7 
billion.  Given the size of the investments, which have varying degrees of risk, and the 
fluctuating economic environment (DLG 2008c) as well as the global impact from the 
sub-prime crisis in the United States, the NSW Department of Local Government 
commissioned a review of the investments of Local Government councils.  The 
purpose of the review was to verify the total investment exposure of NSW Local 
Government councils as well as determine the extent of unrealized losses from these 
investments due to the decline in the sub-prime mortgage market in the United States 
(Cole 2008, p. 3).  In April 2008 the final report, the Cole Report, of the 
commissioned Review of NSW Local Government Investments was published.  The 
following table outlines the exposure identified in the report 
 
 
Table 1: Value of Local Government Investment Losses 
Investment 
Type 
Face Value @ 
30/6/07 ($m) 
Market Value 
@ 31/1/08 
($m) 
Estimated 
Loss ($m) 
Estimated 
Loss (%) 
CDO 590 390 200 34% 
Capital 
protected 
450 400 50 11% 
Managed 
Funds 
2,420 2,350 70 3% 
Subordinated 
debt 
600 600 Nil Nil 
Term Deposit, 
cash, bills 
1,630 1,630 Nil Nil 
Total 5,690 5,370 320 5.6% 
(From Cole 2008, p. 14) 
 
Council funds are primarily composed of two types; short term working 
capital, which account for approximately 70% of the total, and longer term funds 
comprising the 30% residual, which includes capital expenditure commitments (Cole 
2008, p9).  The purpose of investing long term funds should be to ensure that the 
return generated is sufficient to negate the negative impact of inflation on future 
capital works and preserve the purchasing power of financial reserves.  However, 
Cole (2008) highlighted that NSW councils were attracted to higher prospective 
returns available by investing in new investment types, such as CDOs, that differed 
from the traditional fixed interest products (p9-10).  
These new investment types meet the requirements of the Minister of Local 
Government Investment Order (refer Appendix 1) and while compliance with the 
conditions is essential for councils to invest, it should not have been the only or 
sufficient requirement to qualify these types of investment, as NSW councils are also 
required to comply with their fiduciary responsibilities as trustees of public funds 
(Cole 2008, p10).  Commonly the principal investment amounts were credit rated or 
bank guaranteed, however the income stream from the investments were not. Simple 
compliance with the Investment Order was a liberal interpretation of fulfilling the 
requirements and expectations associated with managing public monies, and did little 
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to account for the risk associated with these types of financial instruments.  Gold has 
proposed that this demonstrates that Local Government investment governance is 
inadequate, and that stakeholders, rate payers and the State Government, were being 
exposed to “imprudent investment decisions and economically sub-optimal outcomes” 
(2008, p51).  Even before the credit market crisis was apparent, the NSW Department 
of Local Government was providing information to Local Government councils 
reminding them of their fiduciary duties and responsibilities in respect to financial 
investments.  This communication highlighted to the Local Government councils that 
their responsibility was to ensure that investments were made in accordance with the 
1993 Act with the “onus for investments...to be on preservation of capital rather than 
the rate of return” (DLG 2006) . 
The biggest exposure for NSW Local Government councils is in relation to the 
investments in collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) where the investments are in 
“asset backed securities whose underlying collateral is typically a portfolio of bonds 
or bank loans” (Duffie and Garleanu 2001, p. 41).  The face value of the investments 
in CDOs dropped from $590m on 30th June 2007 to $390m on 30th June 2008, an 
estimated loss of $200 million (Cole 2008, p. 3).   
One of the main promoters of CDO’s to the NSW Local Government councils 
was Lehman Brothers who were “notorious for marketing investment schemes to 
local councils which has resulted in those councils losing millions of ratepayer’s 
dollars” (Roskam, 2008, p. 9).  Unfortunately for millions of investors, (including 
NSW Local Government councils) who invested in Lehmans Brothers’ financial 
investment schemes the investment bank filed for bankruptcy on 14th September 
2008.  Zingales suggests the aggressive leverage policy of Lehman Brothers’, “bad 
regulation, lack of transparency, and market complacency brought about by several 
years of positive returns” (2008, p. 2) led to the collapse of Lehman Brothers.  The 
resulting collapse of Lehman Brothers, who were the fourth largest investment bank 
in the United States, “is generally credited with precipitating the near total collapse of 
confidence that subsequently engulfed the international monetary system” (Roskam, 
2008, p. 9). 
In response to the collapse of Lehman Brothers the NSW Department of Local 
Government issued a Council Circular to all NSW councils, two days after the 
collapse, on the 16th September 2008 requiring councils to “seek urgent financial 
advice as to their potential exposure to Lehman Brothers, as a matter of urgency.  
Councils are required [emphasis added] to identify investments that have direct 
exposure to Lehman Brothers and outline the effect it may have on the Council’s 
activities” (DLG, 2008c).   
The Cole report (2008) estimates that overall NSW councils have lost $320 
million from their investment portfolio, which represents 5.6% of total investments 
and 15.2% of long term funds (p11).  The problem with interpreting these figures is 
that most of these losses are from unrealised investment portfolios and the valuations 
of future returns have generally been provided by those who were also involved in 
marketing the products to councils.  Therefore the future returns may potentially be 
significantly overstated and Cole (2008, p11) identified the exposure in one case to be 
85% of the capital investment.  Additionally, a number of councils are holding 45% of 
their total investments in financial instruments; such as CDO’s, which potentially 
have the greatest risk of loss. 
NSW councils seem to have pursued a policy of either chasing higher returns 
or allowing themselves to be lured into investments containing higher risk factors than 
they have traditionally accepted.  It is unclear if there was a true understanding by 
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councils of the relationship between higher risk and return trade-off.  The up side of 
accepting higher risk was capped at “a couple of percent above the risk free rate” 
(Cole 2008, p11), yet the downside, as stated previously, has been recorded as 85% of 
the original investment.  This suggests that some local councils failed to understand 
that taking on higher risk could generate higher returns as well as increase the 
potential for significant losses. 
The following section outlines the audit function and the application and 
findings of recent Local Government councils’ financial reports with specific focus on 
the audit disclosures. 
 
AUDIT FUNCTION 
 
Sequeria and Johnson explain that “the audit function has assumed the role of 
conferring credibility on the financial statements and ensuring that the statements 
could be relied on for decision making” (2004, p. 94) by various stakeholders 
including members of the community and other government organisations.  Boon, 
McKinnon and Ross explain that stakeholders need to have confidence that the audit 
report is reliable so they are able to make appropriate informed decisions on the 
financial reports (2008, p93).  The auditor is required to obtain a level of certainty that 
will enable them to “provide ‘reasonable assurance’ about the correctness of the 
financial reports” (Boon et al, 2008, p93).  To reduce the likelihood of material 
misstatements, areas that are judged by the auditor to be high risk are likely to attract 
greater attention.  The financial investments of Local Government councils is one area 
which has a high level of risk, in relation to their valuation, and is an area for which 
auditors collect evidence to determine whether or not there is a likelihood of a 
material misstatement. 
When conducting an audit of a Local Government council’s General and 
Special Purpose Financial reports auditors are required to prepare a report which 
includes a statement whether, in the opinion of the auditor the financial reports 
presented have been prepared according to the relevant standards, are consistent with 
the council’s records and fairly present the financial position of the council (1993 Act, 
section 417 (2)).  The purpose of the audit is to provide assurance about whether the 
financial reports have been prepared in accordance with both the relevant accounting 
standards and with the Local Government Code of Accounting Practice and Financial 
Reporting.  However, providing assurance does not guarantee there are no errors, 
omissions or that no fraudulent activities have taken place.  Rather the audit reports 
are supposed to afford a level of confidence that the financial information provided 
can be relied upon, particularly by the stakeholders of the councils, in making 
decisions based about the financial information contained in the financial reports.   
 
AUDIT REPORTS 
 
In 2008 there were, 152 Local Government councils in the State of NSW.  
Each of these 152 councils was classified based on their location in the State, for 
example Urban – metropolitan, according to the Australian Classification of Local 
Governments (ACLG) (Murray and Dollery 2004). 
In this study the focus was on reviewing the online audit reports of the 2007-
2008 financial statements of the NSW Local Government councils.  Of the 152 Local 
Government councils it was only possible to access the online audit reports of 112 
councils (74%).  For the purposes of this report the councils that did not include their 
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financial reports or audit reports on their website have been excluded.  However, the 
lack of financial reports available online and the exclusion of some of the audit 
reports does appear to be a matter for concern regarding the transparency for Local 
Government financial activities. 
The following table shows the spread of qualified and unqualified audit 
opinions issued on the 2007-08 financial statements of the 112 NSW Local 
Government councils included in the study.  
 
Table 2: Audit Opinion 
 
Local 
Government 
category 
Number 
analysed 
Unqualified % Unqualified 
emphasis of 
matter 
% Qualified % 
Urban 
Metropolitan 
developed and 
Capital City 
28 13 46 1 4 14 50 
Urban Regional 34 13 38 3 9 18 53 
Urban Fringe 11 7 64 0 0 4 36 
Rural 
Agricultural 
39 28 72 1 2 10 26 
Rural Remote 0       
Total 112 61 54 5 5 46 41 
 
This table indicates that of the 112 Local Government councils whose financial 
reports were analysed only 54% received an unqualified audit opinion, the opinion of 
the auditor that the financial reports were free from material misstatements, give a 
true and fair view of the organisation and have been prepared in accordance with the 
relevant standards and Acts.  A large percentage of audit reports received a qualified 
audit opinion which is a cause for DLG and the councils.  The main reason for 41% of 
the audit opinions included in this study receiving a qualified audit report was due to 
the councils’ exposure to the impacts from the collapse of the US sub prime mortgage 
market.  In addition most of the audit reports that were not unqualified, expressed 
uncertainty about the full impact that would eventually be recorded on council’s 
investment portfolios due to the problems with investments in the US.  The following 
is an extract from the independent audit report for one council’s who received a 
qualified audit opinion on their general purpose financial reports. 
 
 “Basis for Qualified Auditor’s Opinion 
Since July 2007, global financial markets have experienced a period of 
high volatility led by events in the US housing market, particularly sub prime 
loans, which has impacted the value, recoverability, liquidity, cash flows and 
rates of return of many financial assets including Collateralised Debt 
Obligations (CDOs) … [m]any of these securities do not have market values 
that are independently quoted … [i]ndependent market valuations are not 
readily available … values are assessed based on estimates from issuers and/or 
evaluation models for which there is limited market evidence available to 
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verify their reasonableness.  Further, the ongoing volatility of financial 
markets creates greater uncertainty to the valuation process. 
These circumstances have resulted in our inability to obtain sufficient 
appropriate audit evidence to satisfy ourselves as to the fair value and 
recoverability of $8.2 million of Council’s total investment portfolio” (Auburn 
2008, pp. 48 -49). 
 
While the level of qualified audit opinions is not surprising considering the 
recent global financial crisis, there were other aspects of the audit reports that raised 
concerns.  It was discovered that there was a large proportion of external auditors who 
had used the same wording and in some cases specific accounting firms used a 
standard letter of qualification with spaces to hand write in details such as page 
numbers.  This tends to imply these were generic reports, which therefore raises 
concerns about the independence of these audit reports.  Commonality of wording 
both within audit firms and between audit firms could be an attempt to create a 
common response to the issue which would be an indicator of lack of auditor 
independence.   
Another finding from the review of the Local Government council’s financial 
reports showed that the audit fees disclosed within the reports were ambiguous, with 
separate audit fees relating to a number of audit functions including, but not limited 
to, audits of the financial reports.  This raises questions with respect to the 
independence of auditors if there is fee reliance on additional audit functions 
(Craswell et al 2002).  Craswell (1999) suggested that qualified audit reports are a 
strong indicator that independence has not been compromised, due to the competitive 
nature of auditing.  This may not be true in the public sector if there are limited firms 
willing to engage in auditing of Local Government bodies. In 2006 there were more 
than 40 audit firms engaged in auditing of NSW Local Governments councils and by 
early 2010 the number was reduced to 19 different firms, suggesting reduced 
competition levels.  However if qualified audit reports are an indicator then the high 
proportion of these audit reports would show that independence has been maintained. 
The introduction of competitive tendering for NSW Local Government 
financial statement auditing in the 1993 Act has established the possibility that 
auditors may experience greater time budget pressures.  Coram, Ng and Woodliff 
(2003) survey based study on audit quality found 48% of participants admitted to 
having to reduce audit quality practices during the completion phase of the audit, 
which includes the review for subsequent events.  This would suggest that with 
complex issues such as the losses related to the collapse of CDOs, auditors may not 
have allocated sufficient time to determine the full extent of the losses.  
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This paper has identified the high exposure that a number of local councils in 
NSW have in relation to their investments in structured financial products such as 
CDO’s.  These investments are unlikely to provide sufficient returns of both initial 
capital and capital growth needed to meet the planned obligations and liabilities for 
which the financial investments were intended.  It has been highlighted that there is a 
need to improve the standards for measurement and reporting of these types of 
investments as was outlined in a significant number of audit reports that the auditors 
were unable to reliably value council investments in CDO’s.  This inability to reliably 
determine the correct value of these investments resulted in over 41% of the local 
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council financial statement audit opinions reviewed receiving a qualified audit 
opinion.  This research suggests some local councils either do not understand, or do 
not have the capacity to properly manage the fiduciary duty requirements associated 
with controlling public funds.  In particular, related to the fiduciary duty to act with 
due care and diligence, was the onus on preservation of public funds (DLG, 2006; 
Gold, 2008).  There appears to have been large amounts of trust placed in providers of 
the financial investment products and a lack of consideration given to the risk 
associated with investing in these types of products versus the moderately higher 
returns that the financial investment products purchased by local councils offered. 
This paper has highlighted a number of areas of interest for further research including 
why was there standard disclosure in many of the qualified audit opinions on the sub-
prime issues from a range of different auditors?  Is it a reflection of a perceived need 
by local council auditors to be seen to be consistent in their audit reporting? As 
identified by Cole (2008) there is a need for a standard analysis and reporting method 
to be developed for local councils and this may be seen as an attempt by auditors to 
provide that consistency. 
Councils are required to report the fees that they have paid to auditors and the 
financial reports show these fees.  However, from analysis of the financial reports and 
audit reports, there does seem to be a lack of clarity as to what those audit fees were 
for.  For example some councils have shown an audit fee presumably for the audit of 
the financial reports, and then have also shown other audit fees without providing 
information as to what those additional audit fees consisted.  While it is likely, and 
may be presumed that the other audit fees are for audits of particular sectors such as 
OHS, water or environment, it needs to be clarified for a number of reasons.  For 
example, if the same firm is conducting the additional audits, and the fees earned from 
the additional work is substantially greater than from the audit of the financial reports, 
there may be some compromise of the independence of the financial audit due to the 
reliance by the auditors on revenues from one source.  Likewise it may affect the 
competiveness of the financial audit tender process if some firms are unable to 
conduct the additional audits and the council only desiring to employ one firm. 
Another important element arising from this research is that councils do not 
separate funds that relate to particular liabilities or that have separate restrictions 
associated with them.  The financial reports do not specify what funds have been 
invested in CDO’s, and are therefore at risk of substantial losses, as councils appear to 
reported the treatment of all investment funds in the same manner.  There are also 
inconsistencies among the accounting policies between councils that therefore impede 
transparency (Cole 2008 p24).  Current reporting policies seem to ignore the risk that 
particular products may need to be liquidated prior to maturity triggering losses that 
would need to be reported.  One solution to this would be to promote the use of 
current market valuations across the full range of investment products and require 
disclosure of which funds have been invested in different products.  There seems to be 
a strong need to improve consistency of the reporting, and the accounting methods 
used to account for, and value these products.  It is also evident Local Government 
councils and the NSW Department of Local Government need profession support and 
guidance to understand financial investment products and the fiduciary 
responsibilities they have for managing public moneys. 
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